DAY THIRTY-THREE: Trial Against David Castillo

Last updated: June 9 at 7:00 pm

Main Points of the Day

  • Melissa Cardoza, one of Berta’s close friends and compañera testified that she had not witnessed the level of organized and systematic attacks against Berta like she saw in 2013 when COPINH began the struggle in Rio Blanco. She described the efforts to attack and threaten Berta and COPINH members and create a general sense of insecurity in Rio Blanco. Cardoza testified that Berta had told her not to trust David Castillo and that he monitored her, making use of his intelligence training. According to Cardoza, by the end of 2015, Berta insisted to her closest friends that individuals associated with DESA - the Atalas and Castillo - were going to kill her.

  • Expert witness Harald Waxenecker continued on the stand. He presented an analysis of telecommunications that demonstrates a strategy to compartmentalize information shared between the group of DESA executives and the group of assassins - Douglas Bustillo being the “bridge” between both groups. He argued that this was a military strategy to keep information sharing at a minimum and suppress evidence of the involvement of DESA executives. Waxenecker will present his conclusions tomorrow.

  • Trial is convened tomorrow for 9 am.

More Details

Melissa Cardoza, Berta’s Close Friend and Human Rights Defender, Testifies

NOTE: The transmission on Facebook didn’t start right at the beginning of Cardoza’s declaration and parts were missed.

Cardoza’s Declaration

The Intensity of the Attacks Against Berta Began With The Struggle In Rio Blanco

  • Cardoza began by stating that in the years of friendship with Berta, she had never seen the efforts to criminalize and discredit her, like she had since COPINH started the struggle in Rio Blanco.

  • In 2013, there were two events that Cardoza remembers that highlight her previous statement: In 2013, Juan Ramón Martínez, a columnist in La Tribuna, wrote an article attempting to discredit Berta. It was filled with attacks against her for being a woman, for having a family - a “failed family” - and painted Berta as a woman filled with frustration and resentment. The article said that Berta was against development. After the article was published, Berta and Cardoza discussed it. Berta commented to Cardoza: “What importance do I have to deserve an article like that?”

  • A few months later, Aline Flores, the president of COHEP [the business lobby] made similar comments on TV. Flores stated that Berta was opposed to development and projects that can improve the conditions in communities. These were all efforts to discredit her and the struggle in Rio Blanco.

  • These attacks were also related to Berta being a woman leader. Feminists know that these are strategies to discredit the struggles of women.

  • A second event occurred which made Cardoza realize the seriousness of the attacks against Berta. In 2013, Berta asked a group of women that work in education - Cardoza and the organization Paso a Paso - to go to Rio Blanco because there were a lot of problems with children in the community. Cardoza and others went in December 2013 to do a series of workshops and activities because the children were terrorized. They were living in a state of violence that they had never seen before. Families would tell Cardoza that the Honduran military would arrive to their homes looking for their parents and when they didn’t find them, the military would tell the kids that they were going to kill their parents. This would occur in states under war. Cardoza remembers in those days as well, sometime between December 27 and early January 2014 (which was the time they stayed in Rio Blanco), that people couldn’t even go to the store two blocks away because of the tense security situation in the community. People knew that DESA was paying individuals to attack others associated with COPINH.

Berta Told Her At the End of 2015, That They Were Going To Kill Her

  • In 2015, Cardoza was one of the people that accompanied Berta to receive the Goldman Prize. Cardoza thought the attacks would stop after she received the Goldman Environmental Prize, but they didn’t. At the end of 2015, Berta started to say to her closest friends, that they were going to kill her.

  • Cardoza found out that Berta was killed when someone called her around midnight. She was sleeping in Tegucigalpa. Cardoza asked “What Berta?,” and the person responded, “our Berta".

  • The night of March 2 had a lot of characteristics that left impressions on Cardoza. Berta was unarmed in her home and when she heard the assassins inside the house, she yelled at them, with confidence and bravery, “who’s there?”

  • They tried so hard to discredit her and now since her murder, they still haven’t been able to achieve their goals because Berta lives in all rebellious actions and struggles.

Meeting David Castillo in 2014

  • In 2014, Berta called Cardoza on the phone. She was in Tegucigalpa and Berta said that she was going to stop by. Berta said she needed Cardoza to meet someone. Cardoza saw David Castillo in the Miraflores neighbourhood in Tegucigalpa and Berta introduced Castillo to her.

  • After the meeting, Cardoza asked Berta why she introduced him to her? Berta responded that it was important that she knew who Castillo was. Berta told her that he came from a military school and was specialized in intelligence. When Cardoza asked Berta why she meets with him, Berta responded that she was the coordinator of an organization and that she had to defend her people. Berta knew very well who David Castillo was. She knew that he was going to work to neutralize and control her.

  • An example of Castillo’s efforts to monitor and control Berta occurred once when Cardoza was with Berta one day. They were meeting with various compañeras and the company had filed a legal complaint against Berta. In her defense, the Network of Women Human Rights Defenders published a communique saying they were accompanying Berta. While sitting in the meeting with Berta, Castillo sent her a picture of the Network’s communique with a comment like “look, these are your friends protecting you.” Berta knew very well who Castillo was, she knew was he was playing.

Questions By the Private Accusers

  • Q: You mentioned that you were a friend of Berta Cáceres - what did Berta do? A: Berta had children she loved and she took care of her mom. She defended against the violations of peoples around the country, the Lenca people, but also others.

  • Q: Who did Berta work or struggle with? A: With a lot of people. From the end of the 1990s, she organized COPINH and she struggled in all spaces. Berta was a woman that dialogued with everyone. She was with students, feminists, in territorial struggles, and indigenous peoples. She struggled against racism, not just in Honduras but internationally

  • Q: What work did she do with COPINH? A: Berta and COPINH did organizing, communication, territorial and natural resource defense, food sovereignty, emancipatory struggles and projects. Territorial struggles were a central focus

  • Q: Where did this primarily occur? A: In the headquarters of the organization in La Esperanza and in communities. COPINH is at the service of indigenous communities and they try to respond to the struggles for justice, land, health and education in all parts of the country.

  • Q: You lived in La Esperanza between 2008 and 2013? A: I went to live in La Esperanza, not for Berta, but by my own decision. We lived and worked together.

  • Q: You mentioned that Berta had a lot of adversaries because of her struggle? A: Berta, together with other people, worked collectively and denounced men for violence and aggression. On the radio in La Esperanza, they would say that Berta and COPINH were trying to stop development. There were a lot of efforts to discredit her.

  • Q: What type of threats did Berta receive? A: I can talk about one incident, in 2015. In January in the evening, we were returning to La Esperanza from Rio Blanco. On the way in the middle of nowhere, a group of people detained and surrounded the bus. They asked for Berta to get out but she wasn’t on the bus. We told them that. So they said they were going to come on the bus which they did. They searched the bus with flashlights and then they said that they weren’t going to let us go until Berta showed up there. In the middle of the violence and fear, there were voices in the darkness that were saying “we are going to kill that whore, that bitch, Berta.” We were scared at the level of aggressiveness and hostility. I later spoke to Berta about it and she said that she could never get off that bus, because they would have killed her. She called a designated representative from the Ministry of Security. There was a North American person on the bus with us, who took pictures, got off the bus, and they finally let us go. We told the mob that the Embassy would come and look for him if they tried anything so they let us go. That’s when I lived in first person, the threats Berta experienced.

  • Q: During this experience, do you know what community these people were from? A: I don’t know, we were leaving Rio Blanco. It happened on a curve in the road, maybe near Agua Caliente, but I didn’t know the people. It was dark.

  • Q: Who was in the bus? A: We were coming from a community assembly in Rio Blanco. In 2015, documentary film producers were doing a video about the struggle in Rio Blanco and Berta Cáceres. They were preparing for the Goldman award. We did an assembly in Rio Blanco and they were filming it.

  • Q: In 2013, you mentioned that Berta was denounced, what occurred in this process? A: Berta was criminalized. She was accused of illegal possession of weapons. I was outside the court during the judicial hearings. She was criminalized along with Tomas and Aureliano Molina and they went to trial. The criminalization was related to the Agua Zarca project.

  • Q: Why was it related to the project? A: Because I understand that the company facilitated the detention and their confrontations were intense. They said there was a weapon in her car. The Agua Zarca project was the hardest struggle COPINH has ever faced.

  • Q: Why was it the most conflictive year? A: Because they were pushing the project forward. There were public statements against the struggle.

  • Q: In the process of criminalization, do you know how it turned out? A: The case was dropped.

  • Q: Why did they accuse Berta of being against development? A: This is an argument that they use a lot when a company arrives to a community with a lot of promises like building schools, which the state of Honduras should be doing, not companies. So to oppose this, the company says that the people are against development. And Berta had a position that their type of development focused on economic wealth but she said that development was the protection of natural resources. She had other arguments, other understandings about life and what development is.

  • Q: Why did they consider the river sacred? A: Berta said it in front of millions of people in 2015 when she won the Goldman. The Lenca people come from corn and land and are custodians of the rivers. Rivers are the life of people - it’s where water and life comes from, where people swim, etc. The project would have imprisoned the river.

  • Q: You said in 2013 that you were doing a study with Paso a Paso, in what communities did you do that? A: No, it was not a study. In 2013, I was doing work in Rio Blanco that involved workshops with children that were affected by the violence produced by the presence of the dam.

  • Q: In what communities? A: In Rio Blanco

  • Q: How many children did you interview? A: We didn’t interview any, we did workshops with games and crafts. There were 80 kids or so. Piñatas, games, etc, so a lot of children participated. We were invited by the people of Rio Blanco to help with the fear they felt.

  • Q: What activities what did DESA officials do with state security forces? A: The people in Rio Blanco would say they worked with the army and that there were people in the community paid by DESA. I can’t guarantee that myself but the Armed Forces weren’t operating independently. I saw that very clearly. Not just the army but the police as well. There was a relationship there that showed the power that the company had.

  • Q: When Berta won the Goldman, why did you think the attacks against her would stop? A: She became an important actor on an international level. There was a lot of press that wanted to talk to her. She was recognized as a woman that fights for the environment. I thought this would protect her life and they wouldn’t dare kill a woman that had received such an award.

  • Q: Why did she say they were going to kill her? A: Berta started to say they were going to kill her, she was talking about the owners of the company. Because the economic damage that she and COPINH had caused them. She had denounced their behaviour and the international banks had to pulled out of the project. The international banks care about their profit and money - they think about their money, not people’s lives.

  • Q: [missed the question] A. Berta knew that the banks had money in the projects. But the banks are based in countries that talk about human rights but they were still financing a project where there were threats and a total disrespect for human rights. She denounced them because of this.

  • Q: Let’s talk about the meeting with David Castillo, can you specify what was involved in this meeting? A: I met him in the street, in the Miraflores neighbourhood where I was that day. Berta just introduced him. She always had a practice of advising people that she was meeting with him and she often met him in offices of organizations.

  • Q: What was the reason for the meeting? A: I don’t know. She didn’t tell me

  • Q: (missed the questions). A: Berta wrote me to ask me what I thought about the fact that David Castillo wanted to go and be apart of the award ceremony because he admired her a lot. She also told me that he would invite her places like to a concert somewhere in the US and that he wanted her to go with him. He would offer her money to support her like when her mom was sick or to help her children.

  • Q: What reaction did Berta have to these proposals? A: She thought “how can anyone believe that?”, almost like it was a joke. she knew that Castillo was the manager of the company that COPINH was fighting again. She didn’t believe it - she thought it was a joke. And her reaction was surprise - how could he offer her money? She was surprised, really.

  • Q: What was the reaction in Rio Blanco when Berta was killed? A: When they killed Berta, there was a lot of indignation because the people in Rio Blanco considered Berta as part of their community. Rosalina from the community ensured that the murder was related to her resistance. And people in the community [that were associated with DESA] would say, just like we killed Berta, we’re going to kill the people from COPINH. That hate stayed there - this tension and violence is still there.

Public Prosecutor Questions Cardoza

  • NOTE: The transmission signal cut out for approximately 10 minutes at the beginning of this interrogation. Several questions were missed.

  • Q: You mentioned that there was a lot of hate against COPINH, why did this hate exist? A: I think that the hate was expressed against COPINH had to do with the protection of economic interests in communities where COPINH has a presence.

  • Q: What did you observe exactly in December 2013 about the insecurity that made it difficult to go to the small store in Rio Blanco? A: there was a lot of fear. There were murders that had already occurred, confrontations, and fear that they would attack more people. There was an environment of insecurity - you could feel it.

  • Q: You said other murders had occurred, what murders? A: They murdered Tomas García in 2013

  • Q: You spok eabout some actions against Berta in December 2015, from January to November, did you observe any actions against Berta? A: At the end of 2015, after April [when she was awarded the Goldman Prize], Berta started to say that they were going to murder her. People in the community told her that people were organizing to kill her. Her works are what I noted.

  • Q: You said she referred to national bankers that wanted to kill her, what did she say exactly? A: She referred to the Atala Zablah family, FICOHSA - the owners of the Agua Zarca project.

  • Q: Where were you when you found out about Berta’s murder? A: In Tegucigalpa

  • Q: Why did you say that the motive of the murder was racist? A: The murder was an act against a woman, a feminicide, it was a feminicide linked to a territorial struggle that was led by an indigenous Lenca woman. This murder is about gender and racism because Berta represented the Lenca people.

  • Q: You saw a photo that Bustillo sent to Berta, what other types of messages and photos did he send her? A: I only saw one. But Berta told me that Bustillo would make sexual comments about her body, her beautify. He would say “you look pretty with those clothes or driving that car”. They were sexist expressions.

  • Q: Why did you say Berta knew that David Castillo had intelligence knowledge? A: Berta knew he was a military officer specialized in intelligence and that he was a professional in that. Similar to the idea of the photo that Castillo sent Berta.

  • Q: What photo was it? A: It was the photo that Castillo sent Berta with the communique published by the Network of Women Human Rights Defenders

  • Q: What emancipatory projects did COPINH do? A: They are projects in the communities so that they can decide what they want in their territory. They can say how they want to live, in what manner, and what they want for their lives.

  • Q: Let’s talk about the bus incident, who is Purdott? A: She is a representative from the Ministry of Security that Berta called when she had security incidents. She sent police.

  • Q: What did they do? A: Really nothing.

  • Q: After that incident, what did you do? A: I spoke with Victor Fernandez, and Berta told me to file a legal complaint. I didn’t do this personally. They also presented a complaint to the Network of Women Human Rights Defenders. There is documentation of the incident.

  • Q: Who is Aureliano and Tomas? A: They were compañeros of COPINH at the moment of the criminalization process against Berta. They were very visible in the struggle against Agua Zarca and were judicially persecuted as well.

  • Q: In what struggles did Aureliano and Tomas participate? A: I don’t know.

  • Q: What role did they play in COPINH? A: Tomas was the sub-Coordinator but I don’t know what position Aureliano had.

  • Q: You said that the people that detained the bus wanted to talk to Berta, why? A: they said they had a lot to talk to Berta about, but they wanted her to be there.

The Defense Questions Cardoza

  • Q: What direct aggressions did the company carry out against Berta? A: I think .. what Berta said, was more about the topic of Castillo’s control of her. He was the manager of the company and that was an aggression. The aggressions from Bustillo were sexual in nature.

  • Q: What relationship did Berta have with Douglas Bustillo? A: Douglas was the head of security. None.

  • Q: In this context, did he send sexual messages to her? A: I saw a picture that he sent Berta about the clothing she was wearing

  • Q: What access did you have to the judicial processes where Berta was accused? A: I was outside of the court room during the hearings.

  • Q: Why do you consider that when the Attorney General’s office presses charges, that it is criminalization? A: Because it is persecution when they are pursuing charges against people that are defending their territories, their water, etc. I’m a human rights defender and there are interests to criminalize defenders. But we have the right to struggle and to be persecuted for that, is a form of criminalization.

  • Q: What are the concrete reasons or charges against her? A: They said she had a gun on her but they couldn’t prove it and the charges were dropped.

  • Q: What responsibility did DESA have in the charges related to the gun that was found? A: You have to ask David Castillo that, not me. I don’t know.

  • Q: When you say that Berta received threats from different places, where were some of the projects that COPINH worked on? A: I remember, just by the history of COPINH, that they worked in Montaña de la Flor against logging projects, others close to La Esperanza - those are the ones I remember.

  • Q: How many dams were operating in Rio Blanco? A: In the community of Rio Blanco? What I understand is just Agua Zarca

  • Q: In the communication you had with Berta, what knowledge did you have in January 2015 about threats from a project in Agua Caliente? A: I don’t have that information

  • Q: How well do you know Rio Blanco? A: I went maybe three times to Rio Blanco before Berta was killed and then again another time. I know the people from the community a little bit - those that are close to COPINH.

  • Q: How many communities are there in Rio Blanco? A: There are various but I don’t know exactly how many

  • Q: What year did COPINH arrive to the community of Rio Blanco? A: In 2012, but I’m more aware of 2013. The community requested COPINH’s presence.

  • Q: From what community was COPINH from? A: COPINH is an organization that is in many communities. It has a central office in La Esperanza but in the COPINH assemblies, there are diverse communities from Intibuca and Santa Barbara

  • Q: What actions did COPINH carry out in Rio Blanco? A: I understand they did informative assembles, debates, they organized gatherings to talk about the project. They started a community radio.

  • Q: With the incident in the bus, were they people from the community or from DESA? A: In the community, there is a faction. There are people according to what I’ve been told, that have been paid by the company to create an environment of fear. They do these types of actions. In the form that they operate, they are constant aggressions and confrontations against people. I don’t know all the people from the community

  • Q: What percentage of the community in Rio Blanco are against COPINH? A: I don’t know

  • Q: You said that people wanted to kill Berta in the community? A: I didn’t say they were organizing to kill her, I said that there were people at the bus incident that said they wanted to kill Berta.

  • Q: When you talk about the supposed military arriving to the homes of the people, how do you know this? A: Many people told me.

  • Q: After you lived in La Esperanza, how many times did you go there? A: I went a lot of times and maintained contact with Berta on the phone.

  • Q: What was the reaction of the people in Rio Blanco, when Berta won the award? A: I was there when Berta came with the award and she took it to the community to celebrate. They had food and firecrackers.

  • Q: What knowledge did you have of the real relationship between Berta and David Castillo? A: I don’t understand, can you explain what you mean

  • Q: How often did they meet? A: I don’t know

  • Q: When Berta came to Tegucigalpa, how often would you meet? A: We would see each other frequently. I don’t know how many times - we tried to see each other but I can’t say exactly

  • Q: What do you know about Aureliano Molina, what relationship did Berta have with him? A: They were compañeros from the same organization

  • Q: What knowledge do you have about the legal complaints filed by Berta against Aureliano? I don’t know.

  • Q: Let’s talk about the article written by Juan Ramon Martinez, what knowledge do you have that DESA had a relationship with this man? A: I don’t know. I just said that it was curious that he wrote the article.

  • Q: When you met David Castillo, how did the meeting happen? A: I was in Miraflores and he arrived by car. Berta called me to ask me where I was and that’s why they came there.

  • Q: What information did you have about their meetings? A: I know that he invited her to go out and to go to a concert in San Francisco. But I don’t know how many times and I don’t know how real the invitations were.

  • Q: What was Berta’s relationship with mayors in the region? A: There is a video of a discussion between Berta and another man, but I don’t know if it’s a mayor. There was a conflictive relationship

  • Q: What knowledge did you have of the threats against her that came from the mining sector? A: Threats … I don’t know. She never mentioned any

Waxenecker Continues His Expert Analysis of Power Networks

  • Waxenecker continued his presentation from where he left on discussing 4.2.3 Third Stage (June to October 2011)

    • August 2, 2011: Potencia y Energia de Mesoamerica, S.A. (PEMSA) did not only become an owner of DESA in 2011, but it had also financed it’s operations since at least 2010. In an DESA assembly, the capital invested in DESA by PEMSA was 3,999,900.00.

  • 4.2.4 Fourth Phase (October 2011 to present)

    • October 11, 2011: There was an agreement between PEMSA and Inversiones Las Jacarandas.

    • November 7, 2011: In an assembly, DESA’s social capital increased to a minimum of 50 million Lempiras which PEMSA contributed 16.65 million (16,650 shares) and Inversiones Las Jacarandas 33.35 million (33,350 shares). Inversiones Las Jacarandas was represented by José Eduardo Atala Zablah

      • DESA’s administration council was named in this meeting: Roberto David Castillo Mejía (President), Jacobo Nicolás Atala Zablah (Vice President), Jorge Corea Lobo (vocal primero [not sure how to translate this], José Eduardo Atala Zablah (vocal segundo), Roberto Pacheco Reyes (secretary), Tanya Romero Baca (vocal suplente), Pedro Atala Zablah (vocal suplente), and Karla López Matarmoros (commissioner).

      • Since this date, the DESA’s executive body did not change from Agua Zarca’s implementation process on November 2011 to the end of 2017.

    • December 1, 2011: The administrative council gave Roberto David Castillo Mejía (President) and Jacobo Nicolás Atala Zablah (Vice President), two general administrative power of attorneys

    • May 24, 2012: Carolina Lizeth Castillo Argueta’s legal mandate was expanded and she was given special representation authority for DESA.

    • August 27, 2012: PEMSA was registered in Panama using the meeting minutes of the investors meeting, listing Castillo as President, Roberto José Pacheco Reyes (Treasurer) and Carolina Castillo Argueta (Secretary)

    • December 23, 2013: In DESA’s assembly, it’s minimum capital was increased to 143 million Lempiras. PEMSA took over 48,620 shares for a total value of 48.62 million Lempiras and Inversiones Las Jacarandas, 94,380 shares for a total of 94.38 million Lempiras.

  • Action Related to the Agua Zarca dam at this time

    • November 17, 2011: DESA requested an expansion of the Agua Zarca project to a capacity of 21.7 MW to authorities at the Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources (SERNA)

    • December 27, 2011: Municipal authorities in Intibuca granted a construction permit to DESA to build the Agua Zarca dam for one year.

    • January 17, 2012: The Operation Contract for the Agua Zarca project was modified between DESA and SERNA

    • March 6, 2012: SERNA and DESA sign an addendum to the exploitation contract for the Agua Zarca project

    • May 10, 2012: DESA presents an environmental impact study for an expansion to the environmental license.

    • October 31, 2012: Municipal authorities in San Francisco de Ojüera grant a construction permit to the Agua Zarca dam.

    • January 24, 2013: SERNA grants the expansion of the environmental license requested by DESA. These respective changes were not modified on the Operations contracts and were not ratified by Congress.

    • January and July 2013: The construction of the project began and was led by SINOHYDRO. On July 15, 2013, the construction was temporarily suspended and SINOHYDRO terminated the contract.

    • December 13, 2013: President David Castillo informed the company that the process of development of the Agua Zarca dam had resulted in problems provoked by leaders of COPINH which had caused delays in the construction, the termination of the contract with SINOHYDRO and other situations.

  • In the conditions, negotiations with international banks began

    • November 20, 2013: A direct contract was signed between ENEE, FMO, CABEI, and DESA

    • November 22, 2013: A direct contract was signed between SERNA, FMO, CABEI, and DESA

    • From December 2013 to April 2014, a series of contracts were signed that include: DESA, PEMSA, Inversiones Las Jacarandas, BCIE, Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas, Banco LAFISE (Honduras), FMO, and FINNFUND

    • April 9, 2014: Trust Guarantee and Administration Contract (Contrato de Fideicomiso de Garantía y Administración). The FMO, together with FINNFUND contribute $15 million and CABEI bank grants $24 million.

  • 4.2.5 The Network Around PRODERSSA

    • April 28, 2013: PRODERSSA’s shares are held by: Roberto Arturo Mejía Salgado (2500 shares), José Miguel Mendoza Rubio representing Inversiones Agroindustriales del Pacifico (2500 shares).

    • This company, through its shareholders are linked to the Rivera Maradiaga family (Los Cachiros) who have been convicted of drug trafficking in US courts.

    • David Castillo holds 1 share in PRODERSSA and in August 2014 was named as President.

    • January 16, 2014: PRODERSSA signs a contract with the ENEE for the Agua Fría solar project located in Nacaome, Honduras. The project received international backing through PRODERSSA’s relationship with Norway’s KLP Norfund Investments and Scatec Solar.

    • November 29, 2017: PRODERSSA revokes the general administration power granted to David Castillo.

    • March 5, 2018: The Public Prosecutor’s Office seizes 58 assets linked to the Rivera Maradiagas (Los Cachiros) and PRODERSSA is one of them.

  • 5. David Castillo’s Relationships and Power Resources (Recursos de poder)

    • 5.1 Flow of Economic Resources: The general availability and flow of economic resources to materialize Berta Cáceres’s murder.

      • Early stages (2010 to 2013): PEMSA and Inversiones Las Jacarandas have shares in DESA; two bank credits (from FICOHSA $5 million and FICENSA $8 million). Then on December 19, 2013, the CABEI and FMO international banks approve $44.4 million in funding for the Agua Zarca dam.

      • Waxenecker quotes the Sentencing court’s sentence of the seven hitman and intermediaries: “The motives of the accused individuals  individuals to commit the crime was the promise of an offered payment by members of DESA, specifically Roberto David Castillo …” He then states that it’s important that Honduran courts expand their financial investigations of the project including international financing.

    • 5.2. Communication Network

      • 5.2.1. Global Network and Temporary Development. Waxenecker does an analysis of the position of the telephone numbers (nodes) in conjunction with the relationship between the calls. He breaks the phone calls into periods of time starting on March 5, 2015 and ending March 9, 2016. He notes communication between Douglas Bustillo and Sergio Rodriguez with an informant in Rio Blanco named Salvador Sanchez.

        • Waxenecker shows that the intensity of the communication between Jorge Avila and Douglas Bustillo increases in period 12 (February 1, 2016 to March 2, 2016) and  David Castillo, Daniel Atala, Sergio Rodriguez and Mariano Diaz Chavez maintain their role as central figures in the communication network.

        • Sub-networks are identified. These sub-networks maintain a compartmentalization and interconnection in the broader communication network. These sub-networks include: An executive (or superior structure) network where the decisions are made, and an inferior network (operative network) including Bustillo, Mariano Diaz Chavez, and Henry Hernandez, and the other assassins.

      • 5.2.2. k-Neighbors/compartmentalization: These two subnetworks have a modus operandi of compartmentalization and hierarchy. This is a sign of a highly specialized military logic. It’s intention is to not compromise information and the structure of the network. It proactively hides all criminal activity.

        • The superior structure of the network is significant as you can clearly see the interrelationship between DESA’s executives and the material actors or hitman that carried out the murder.

        • In this communication structure, David Castillo maintained a position of power and hierarchy.

      • 5.3. (In)formal Security and Capacity for Violence. There are circles of formal and informal institutional security in different moments that surrounding the dam’s operations. Waxenecker analyzes communications between informant Salvador Sanchez in Rio Blanco and Sergio Rodriguez and Douglas Bustillo. And between Clementino (another informant), Douglas Bustillo and Jorge Avila.

        • In the timeframe analyzed, Castillo and Bustillo’s communication never changed (despite Bustillo not working with DESA any longer)

        • In the Whatsapp chat group “Security PHAZ”, David Castillo, Daniel Atala, Sergio Rodriguez, Jorge Avila, and four other DESA executives were constantly informing each other about the monitoring of Berta Caceres.

DAY THIRTY-TWO: Trial Against David Castillo

NOTE: I skipped Day 31 to keep on track with the day count published by COPINH who counted a short hearing about the health concerns of the lawyers and subsequent suspension as a day in court.

Last update: June 8 at 2 pm

Main Points of the Day

  • Expert witness presented by the Cáceres family, Harald Waxenecker begins his presentation. Waxenecker outlines the irregular manner in which the Agua Zarca was approved in the post-2009 coup context and the illicit networks of individuals, including Castillo, in the military, state institutions, and business elite, that sought to benefit from influence peddling, corruption, irregularities in the approval process, among other points. On two occasions, the court asked Waxenecker to skip forward in his presentation, forcing him to exclude aspects of his analysis.

  • The trial is convened again tomorrow at 9 am.

COPINH publishes a short summary of some of the key elements mentioned by Waxenecker.

COPINH publishes a short summary of some of the key elements mentioned by Waxenecker.

From top left to bottom right.

“In 2009, David Castillo was in key positions in the Armed Forces and the National Electrical Energy Company (ENEE) that provided him with privileged access to information including documents about the hydroelectric project on the Gualcarque river, through Carolina Castillo, who was the President of the ENEE union.

June 3, 2010: Carolina Castillo signs a contract with Roberto Anibal Lozano, Manager of ENEE.

2010: DESA receives the Agua Zarca hydroelectric project contract in line with parallel processes carried out by Castillo in 2009. David Castillo participated in the meeting where the decision was made to grant the project to DESA.

2009: Castillo intervened to create a standard Power Purchasing Agreement (PPA) establishing a parallel mechanism for companies that did not meet the technical or legal standards to be eligible to bid on a project.

2009: David Castillo was a technical assistance to ENEE’s management and intervened in ENEE decision-making and management.

In just two days (June 21 and 22, 2010), DESA obtained the Energy Generation contract, the Exploitation of National Water Resource for the Agua Zarca hydroelectric dam project contract, and the Operation for the Generation, Transmission and Commercialization of Electric Energy contract.*

*(white writing at bottom right): “The MACCIH [Anti-corruption body] and the Special Prosecutor for Indigenous Peoples have worked together … on possible inconsistencies of the state’s process to grant a concession in such a short period of time, for a hydroelectric project to a company that did not meet the budget and technical capacity to obtain it” (OEA-MACCIH, 2017: 24)

More Details

Harald Waxenecker Presents his Expert Analysis

  • Titled: “Analysis of Roberto David Castillo Mejía’s position of corporate-institutional power and his involvement in the planning, coordination, and execution of Berta Cáceres’s murder”. The presentation consists of 201 Powerpoint slides and is very dense and detailed. The presentation ended on slide 123 at 5 pm as Waxenecker testifies via Zoom from Austria which is 8 hours ahead of Honduras. He requested to continue his presentation the following day.

  • Structure of the presentation. Part 1: Introduction, 2: Theoretical and method framework, 3: Socio-historical conditions of the murder, 4. Roberto David Castillo Mejía’s position of power, 5. Castillo Mejia’s relationships and resources of power, 6. Conclusions

  • 1. Introduction: The expert analysis analyzes Roberto David Castillo Mejía’s [RDCM] positions and relationships of power that caused him to materialize Berta Cáceres Flores’s murder in March 2016 through by: 1. Analyzing RDCM’s institutional and business relationships in the context of the adjudication and implementation of energy projects in Honduras, specifically around the Agua Zarca project, which conditioned the motive of the crime, 2. An analysis of the RDCM’s power relations that made the planning, coordination, and execution of the crime possible.

  • 2. Theoretical and method framework, 2.1. Theoretical and conceptual references. Waxenecker outlines the concepts of:

    • “Politicized nature" - the appropriation of natural resources that occurs within the contradictions of power.

    • Illicit political and economic networks - relationships and interactions between multiple actors including active and retired military; state actors (ENEE, Ministry of the Environment (SERNA), Armed Forces, National Party, National Congress, mayors, etc); Business actors (Investors and DESA directives, financial institutions, international banks, etc.); criminal actors (assassins, drug trafficking, etc). A mix of these actors get together with shared or common interests. The focus of this specific case is networks which involve the appropriation of natural resources and the materialization of violence.

    • Positions and relationships of power - Within positions and relationships of power, there are sub-systems and systems of interactions which can be direct or indirect which connects individuals within the networks to people in power (social capital).

    • 2.2. Methods and data - Wexenecker used a combination of methods; data sources; company registries, and telephone data analysis.

  • 3. Socio-historical conditions of the murder: Berta Cáceres was murdered in the context of the social contradictions provoked by the implementation of the Agua Zarca project. Waxenecker discusses the context of this murder, including:

    • The liberalization of the energy market in Honduras - There was an energy crisis in the 1990s which began a process of liberalization through the Sub-sector Electricity Law (Decree 158-1994) which allowed for the private generation of electricity via fossil fuels. Then in 2007, the Incentive Law for Electrical Energy Generation (Decree 70-2007) which granted higher contracts for renewable energy generation. And a reform to Decree 138-2013 which provides additional incentive ($0.03 USD) for solar energy generation; the Industrial Electrical Law (Decree 404-2013) which outlines the importation and exportation of electric energy to commercialize energy, and the distribution and transmission of the electrical system in Honduras [aka. full blown privatization]. In 2013, bank trusts were set up to four private national banks (Banco Atlántida (received two trusts), Financiera Comercial Hondureña, Banco Continental) with the purpose of resolving the “technical and financial losses” of ENEE.

    • The post-coup context - Many academics and the UN via the resolution to condemn the coup on July 1, 2009, agree that a coup took place. Quoting the Truth Commission (2012), Waxenecker outlines how the coup exacerbated historical barriers established by powerful groups to limit the possibility of developing democracy for all in Honduras. Also how the coup deepened social and political polarization. The coup was characterized by and began on-going processes (that continue today) of: a concentration of political power; distortion of the economic competitiveness; and the remilitarization and patterns of human rights violations including excessive use of force, criminalization, selective repression, and the disfunction of the judicial system. The coup leads to the following contextual factors and characteristics:

      • Changes in the Honduran electrical sector - the post-coup national circumstances influence the complex composition of economic, political and military power that reduces competitiveness and politicizes the sector and also, assists in the formation of illicit networks. The reduced competitiveness are caused by tax rates, criminality, government inefficiency, corruption and political instability.

      • Remilitarization and patterns of human rights violations - the clear transgression of the separation of civil and military duties influenced by the strengthening of the power of the military. New laws were approved that permitted the militarization of public security including: Military Amnesty (2-2010); Constitutional reform to Article 274 (233-2011); Creation of the TIGRES police force (103-2013); Creation of the Military Police (168-2013), and others.

    • The deformation of the Honduran electrical sector - The energy sector followed an international tendency to increase investments to renewable energy projects. This occurs in the context of the international tendency for offshore production and the externalization of socio-environmental impacts. This allows for an “absolute disassociation” between economic growth and the environmental impact of projects. There is an influx of investment towards energy projects. Some focussed on the reduction of C02 emissions which provokes conflicts related to the appropriation of natural resources.

      • In the context of post-coup Honduras, at least 185 Power Purchasing Agreement (PPA) contracts were signed by ENEE between 2010 and 2014 growing from contracts with 59 companies for a total of 789.8 MW of energy in 2010 to contracts with 100 companies for a total of 2,043.5 MW in 2014 (source: TSC, 2018).

      • Of the contracts granted in 2010 (including the contract to DESA), 26 companies did not fulfill their contractual clauses and despite this, they were not rejected by ENEE. In 2010, via 043-2010, DESA was granted the contract for the Agua Zarca dam. Individuals involved in the contract process are being investigated for fraud, abuse of authority, mismanagement, falsification of documents, etc.

[NOTE: Around this moment of the presentation, the court interrupts Waxenecker and asks him to skip forward to the parts about the planning and coordination of the murder. Waxenecker briefly skips through a series of slides to accommodate the court’s request]

  • ENEE signed contracts with 23 companies in January 2014 despite 21 of those companies not fulfilling the established requirements to bid for state contracts. One of these companies is PRODERSSA [linked to David Castillo].

  • Many of these contracts with ENEE in the context described above caused the ENEE’s economic situation to worsen. In 2017, the ENEE calculated a loss of 4,548.8 million Lempiras, 16% higher than in 2016 for a total accumulated deficit of 51,941.5 million Lempiras.

4. David Castillo’s Position of Power: This is broken into: 4.1 A parallel contract model: 043-2010, 4.2: DESA: A history in stages: Stage one (May 2009 to January 2010); Stage two (Jan 2010 to June 2010); stage three (June to October 2011); stage four (2012 to present); the network around PRODERSSA.

  • 4.1 A Parallel Contract Model: 043-2010 - Context 2009-2010: Coup d’état and international public bidding process for renewable energy (No. 100-1293-2009). In this context: Since 2006, David Castillo had worked in the Armed Forces. In May 2008, he was assigned to the ENEE in the position, Coordinator of Management Control. He received two salaries - one from the Armed Forces and the other from ENEE. He was promoted in 2006, then given the position in ENEE in 2008, and then he was demoted on December 1, 2011. In the time he worked in ENEE, he worked with Carolina Lizeth Castillo Argueta, President of the ENEE union.

    • In 2009, DESA presented a bidding offer but was disqualified on December 18, 2009. Following this, Castillo intervened to develop a Power Purchasing Agreement “standard model” paralleling the bidding process.

    • The bidding process No. 100-1293-2009 was approved under the governments of Roberto Micheletti Bain and Porfirio Lobo Sosa. Despite being disqualified and being declared as inadmissible, the ENEE authorized the inscription of renewable energy contracts for the perviously disqualified companies.

    • DESA was favored in this process. On June 2, 2010, David Castillo participated in the ENEE board meeting (session 1079-2010). The contract between DESA and ENEE was signed on June 3, 2010.

    • According to the MACCIH [anticorruption body], there is sufficient evidence that “ … correspond to the existence of collusion between public officials and outsiders … [..] that favored DESA in an undue manner.…”

  • 4.2.1 First stage (May 2009 to January 2010)

    • May 20, 2009: DESA filed it’s paperwork and was formally created

    • November 20, 2009: DESA named Carolina Castillo Argueta as a special representative to participate in the bidding process.

    • January 21, 2010: DESA receives an operations contract.

    • Jan 22, 2010: DESA receives a contract for the Agua Zarca project

    • Jan 22, 2010: DESA receives an operations contract

  • 4.2.2. Second stage (Jan 2010 to June 2011)

    • June 3, 2010: DESA signs a contract with ENEE

    • June 22, 2010: DESA names new board members. Carolina Castillo maintains her position as a legal representative.

    • Oct 26, 2010: National Congress approves PPA contracts including the contract between ENEE and DESA

    • Nov 23, 2010: PEMSA [another company affiliated with David Castillo] registers as a company in Panamá

    • March 24, 2011: SERNA grants the environmental license to the Agua Zarca project noting that DESA had to present a document outlining the community consultation and consent for the project.

    • March 25, 2011: SERNA signs off on the environmental license to DESA

    • June 14, 2011: Various state institutions sign a “support agreement” with DESA for the hydroelectric project.

    • August 30, 2012: the National Congress approved 24 agreements which were published on January 26, 2013. This was a critical part of the Agua Zarca project because the PPA contract was formalized, approved by Congress, the construction, operations and environmental license was granted, and a support agreement signed with state institutions and DESA.

    • August 2, 2011: In an investors meeting, an investment was approved for 563,902.76 Lempiras. Up to that moment, DESA’s start up capital was only 25,000 Lempiras. A total of 598,283.39 was approved to carry out an environmental impact study. In addition, debts to be paid to Digital Communications (DIGICOM) and other companies were approved. DIGICOM is owned by David Castillo.

  • 4.2.3 Third stage (June to October 2011)

    • June 14, 2011: DESA’s value was listed at a maximum of 4 million Lempiras and a minimum of 1 million Lempiras. The investors were listed as PEMSA represented by Roberto Pacheco Reyes [ex-Minister of Government during Ricardo Maduro government 2002-2006), and Jorge Coreo Lobo.

    • June 21, 2011: Meetings were held in some villages in Rio Blanco. Former mayor Martiniano Domínguez and community representatives participated. David Castillo was also present despite not having a formal position in the company.

      Presentation ended for the day. To be continued when the expert witness is called again

DAY THIRTY: Trial Against David Castillo

Main Points of the Day

  • The trial was held for a few hours today. Castillo’s defense attorneys attempted to recuse the private accusers’s expert witness Harald Waxenecker because of previous publications Waxenecker had made about Honduras. After a few hours of debate, the court rejected the defense’s motion.

  • The trial will convene on Monday, June 7 at 9:00 am.

DAY TWENTY-NINE: Trial Against David Castillo

NOTE: The court convened briefly today (Thursday, June 3) to discuss the health concerns of two attorneys representing the Cáceres family. The judges are waiting for covid results to make decisions about when the trial will convene again.

********

NOTE: Today, Wednesday, June 2nd, the trial did not take place as planned because of a health concern raised by the private accusers (Cáceres family lawyers). It is convened again for tomorrow at 9 am.

Last update (for notes below): June 2 at 9:15 pm

Main Points of the Day

  • Expert witness Gladys Tzul spent the day on the stand being questioned mostly by Castillo’s defense team. Tzul finished her appearance in court. The trial will continue on Wednesday

More Details

Expert Witness Gladys Tzul Continues on the Stand

  • The court verifies the judicial files that were given to Tzul to complete her expert analysis after a question from the prosecutors from day twenty-eight.

  • Private Accusers (Cáceres family lawyers) Question Tzul

    • Q: How much time did you have to conduct your analysis from the time you received the information from the court? A: 7 days

    • Q: In what year did you conduct the interviews used in your analysis? A: In 2017

    • Q: In conclusion #4 you made reference to ‘sacred notions’, what are you referring to? A: These sacred notions are part of the cosmovision of the Lenca people who believe that the river has a feminine spirit and is cared for by [the spirit of] girls. This belief is politically and socially fundamental to the communities. This is what I was told in interviews.

    • Q: You mentioned the campaigns to discredit Berta Cáceres. What did these campaigns entail? A: They were used against Berta Cáceres for being COPINH’s coordinator. They accused her of being against development because defending communal concepts in a liberal political framework means that one is against development. Even though communities may not have economic income, they have richness through their water, land, and territories.

  • Castillo’s Defense Team Questions Tzul.

    • [NOTE: The questioning begins with the technical consultant Edgardo Rodríguez. Rodríguez is a controversial figure as he resigned from his university teaching position after it was reported that he called his students “little gay boys” (mariconcitas) and “little girls (niñitas). In this trial, the court equated his credentials as a technical consultant to the credentials of Gladys Tzul, a gender violence expert. For several hours, the defense asked several detailed questions, many of them were objected to by the prosecutors and private accusers. It seemed like there were more questions that received objections than there were questions that were answered.]

    • Q: You talked about military occupation in Lenca territories, how do you define military occupation? A: The entrance and presence of the Armed Forces

    • Q: What is your role inside the indigenous movement? A: I’m a social, community-oriented researcher.

    • Q: On page 2 of your analysis, you said that the report reviews and analyzes specific theories. What relationship do these academic discussions have with concrete facts? Objection

    • Q: You said you interviewed people from Intibuca. How many people did you interview? A: I did two field work visits. In the first, I spoke with 36 people and the second, 22 people

    • Q: What percentage of the population do the 36 and 22 people represent? A: There is no perception of universality in my analysis

    • Q: What level of knowledge do you have of the demographic composition of Honduras? Objection

    • Q: What is the Lenca population in Honduras? A: I understand that you’re looking for a quantitative analysis. This is a qualitative analysis. Secondly, the state registry of these numbers do not record self-identification of indigenous identity and there are processes of self-identification inside communities. This limits the ability to know really know about indigenous populations. That’s why I don’t use it because it can be an obstacle.

    • Q: Why did you say that 91% of the Honduran population is rural? A: I got this figure from the Honduran Institute of Anthropology and History from a specific academic study.

    • Q: [Technical consultant reads a DESA communique talking about Lenca communities being manipulated.] Why did you say in this study that this is a racist policy? A: It says that Berta Cáceres is manipulating the communities. This communique indicates that indigenous populations can be manipulated and they don’t have the ability to analyze and understand their situation on their own.

    • Q: How do you identify ideologically? Objection

    • Q: You said that Berta was anti-capitalist, if we are talking about capitalism, what ideology do you identify with? Objection

    • Q: You mentioned the Popular Women’s courts that COPINH organized, what level of recognition or legitimacy do these courts have by the Honduran state? A: These courts are a part of historical processes inside communities. They have been conserved as has the capacity to make justice.

    • Q: You refer to political registries, are you referring to the political system? A: There are liberal state framework (such as insitutions that make up the state) and another type of registry from a different type of political system which is communal. The individual is not at the center of this second type and instead, the community is. They establish a knowledge about territory, water, etc.

    • Q: What is your position about hydroelectric projects? A: I presented my conclusions, I don’t have a position. I’m not Honduran

    • Q: You said that Castillo tried to be Cáceres’s friend, offered her favors - how can you conclude as as sociologist that there is gender violence in the short conversation you referenced? A: These are evaluations that I made from various parts of conversations. I listed the ways in which acts and behaviors are identified as gender violence against women.

    • Q: You talked about friendship not being able to exist in situations of inequality. How is this possible if we all have friendships with people that are from different cultures, different economic backgrounds, etc? Objection (she answered). There is always a relation of power in these types of relationships (ex. teacher and a student).

    • The defense lawyers take over the questioning

    • Q: In your analysis about Berta Cáceres, what relevance did you give to topics that we are discussing today? Objection

    • Q: Why in your analysis did you use the research of the GAIPE as a central resource? Objection

    • Q: In your analysis, what do men represent in the social realm? Objection

    • Q: Why did you take the data about murders of women from 2013 and not the range from 2013 to 2017? [inaudible]

    • Q: What was the murder rate of women in 2013 to 2017? I don’t have that information

    • Q: What knowledge do you have of the population demographics in Intibuca? Objection

    • Q: How many communities are there in Rio Blanco? Objection

    • Q: When you were in La Esperanza, what importance did you give to the relationship between communities in Santa Barbara with respect to COPINH’s actions? A: I studied violence against women

    • Q: You used charts to describe chats between different people, on chart xyz (names specific chart), what types of chats are they? A: They are group chats

    • There were more questions but many were objected to and many are largely irrelevant.